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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 18-1545 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONY GAINES,  
a/k/a “Monte,” 
Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-17-cr-00309-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 April 2, 2019 
 
Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and SILER,* Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 3, 2019) 
  
                                                 
* The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge for the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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____________ 
 
OPINION** 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Anthony Gaines was sentenced to 42 months in prison after he pleaded guilty to 
three counts charging violations of federal animal welfare laws that criminalized his dog-
fighting activities. Gaines raises three principal issues on appeal, none of which we find 
persuasive. We will therefore affirm.   
I1 
Counts One and Two charged Gaines with conspiracy to participate in an animal 
fighting venture contrary to 7 U.S.C. § 2156(b) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count 
Three charged him with possession of a dog for purposes of having it participate in an 
animal fighting venture contrary to 7 U.S.C. § 2156(b) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 49.  
The first issue Gaines raises is that Counts One and Three should have been 
grouped with Count Two under § 3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines. The Probation 
Office declined to do so in its Presentence Investigation Report, however, finding that 
because Counts One and Three involved a dog named Vida and Count Two involved a 
dog named Bubbles, there were two “victims” under the Guidelines and the statute. App. 
                                                 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
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253–54 (sentencing transcript). Gaines objected to the PSR, but the District Court 
overruled the objection and agreed with the PSR’s assessment.  
Gaines argues here, as he did to the District Court, that Vida and Bubbles should 
not have been deemed “victims” under the Guidelines because they are dogs, not people. 
Br. 15. We have not addressed this argument previously and we need not do so in this 
appeal. Regardless of whether dogs can qualify as “victims” under the Guidelines, the 
record demonstrates that the counts involving Vida and Bubbles—which involved 
distinct instances of illegal conduct almost a year apart and involving different co-
conspirators—should not group under Guidelines § 3D1.2. We will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment on that ground. See United States v. Miller, 224 F.3d 247, 248 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (stating that we may affirm for any reason supported by the record). 
Contrary to Gaines’s argument, declining to group his counts does not impose 
“multiple punishment[s] for substantially identical offense conduct.” United States v. 
Rudolph, 137 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting U.S.S.G. Ch. 3 Pt. D, intro. cmt.). 
Gaines’s dog-fighting crimes created a “separate and distinct fear and risk of harm to 
society.” United States v. Griswold, 57 F.3d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 1995). Gaines purchased 
Vida from Robert Arellano in December 2014 and kept her until November 2015 for use 
in dog fights at or around his residence. In October 2015, Gaines traveled to Indiana with 
Frank Nichols to deliver Bubbles to Dajwan Ware for the same purpose. Unlike cases 
where the ungrouped counts represented “no additional conduct,” here Counts One and 
Three (involving Vida) addressed “instances of illegal conduct” separate from Count 
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Two (involving Bubbles). Gaines’s behavior is analogous to the separate purchases and 
possession of firearms over the course of two years that we held should not group in 
Griswold. 57 F.3d at 296 (citing United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1306 (3d Cir. 
1991)).  
The upshot of Gaines’s argument is that courts must group every crime committed 
to advance an individual’s dog-fighting venture, even if those crimes involve different 
participants, times, and locations. But this case does not present an “occasion[] when 
increasing the punishment for an additional count would punish the defendant for conduct 
taken into account in another count.” Rudolph, 137 F.3d at 180 (quoting United States v. 
Bush, 56 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 1995)). Rather, the charges Gaines faced addressed 
separate incidents of criminal culpability. See id. Therefore, the District Court’s decision 
not to group Counts One and Three with Count Two was not legal error. See id. at 178. 
II 
Gaines next argues his 42-month sentence was unreasonable because it was driven 
more by “the District Court’s disfavor with the crime” than the appropriate statutory 
factors. Br. 28. We disagree. The District Court based its upward variance not on any 
generalized disfavor toward the crime, but on appropriate statutory factors, including: 
Gaines’s long criminal record, incorrigibility, extensive involvement in dog-fighting, and 
enjoyment of the “sport’s” cruelty. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553; App. 283–89, 305–06. The 
Court considered mitigating factors, including Gaines’s troubled childhood, family 
history, and child support obligations. See App. 306, 309. The Court also considered the 
5 
 
Government’s request for a 41-month sentence, which was based on similar defendants. 
See App. 274–76, 307.  
In sum, the District Court considered all the appropriate factors and no improper 
ones. We will not second-guess the District Court’s discretionary decision, which was 
well-supported by the facts of record. See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 569 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (en banc).2 
III 
Lastly, Gaines argues the District Court’s order that his federal sentence run 
consecutively to his then-impending state sentence for drug crimes was inappropriate. He 
claims Guidelines § 5G1.3 called for concurrent sentences. We are unpersuaded. The 
Guidelines require concurrent sentences only if the state offense “is relevant conduct to 
the instant offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b), (c). We agree with the District 
Court that Gaines’s state drug offenses were “not related to the dog-fighting ventures 
here.” App. 307. Other than the fact that authorities discovered the dog fighting while 
                                                 
2 We reach the same conclusion for Gaines’s argument that his sentence violated 
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. He claims the District Court “apparently” 
based its variance on the increased 2016 Guidelines range rather than follow only the 
applicable 2015 version. Br. 33. But Gaines cites no mention of the 2016 Guidelines by 
the Court. Instead, he relies on the fact that the upward variance to 42 months landed 
within the 2016 Guidelines’ range (37–46 months) for Gaines’s offenses. This is 
insufficient, especially since the Court calculated the correct 2015 offense level and range 
before varying upward. See App. 304, 306; see also Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 
530, 549 (2013) (noting that district courts may consider newer Guidelines when 
deviating from older ones).  
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investigating Gaines’s drug offenses, there is nothing to relate the state drug offenses to 
his federal animal welfare crimes. The Court therefore did not abuse its discretion, see 
United States v. Napolitan, 830 F.3d 161, 164 (3d Cir. 2016), when it ordered Gaines’s 
federal sentence to run consecutively with his state sentence. 
* * * 
This case is a sad reminder that man’s best friend is susceptible to man’s worst 
impulses. The District Court did not err when it declined to group Gaines’s convictions 
for distinct dog-fighting crimes. The Court relied on the appropriate statutory factors, not 
the wrong version of the Guidelines, when it decided to vary upward. Finally, the Court 
did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a consecutive sentence because Gaines’s 
federal offenses were unrelated to his state drug offenses. We will therefore affirm. 
